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Draft Card Burning
Robert M. Phillips*
F OR THE FOURTH TIME in less than three years, an attack has been made
in the courts upon the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
as amended (1965),' alleging its unconstitutionality as applied to the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 The cases in point
are United States v. Edelman, et al.,3 Smith v. United States,
4 United
States v. Mifler,5 and United States v. O'Brien.6 Of the few, only United
States v. O'Brien has reached the Supreme Court of the United States.
7
In the cases cited above, the defendant publicly burned his Selective
Service Classification Card, i.e., his draft card, primarily in "symbolic"
protest over the government's involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.8 In
the first two cases, defendant alleges, inter alia, that the burning of his
draft card was a form of speech protected under the First Amendment
of the Constitution.9 He further contends that the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended (1965), expressly prohibiting draft
card destruction or mutilation, is an unconstitutional abridgment of his
right to "symbolic" freedom of speech.' 0
It has long been recognized by the courts that not only written and
spoken words," but certain acts and conduct will likewise be considered
a form of speech 12 protected under the First Amendment. 13 However,
it has been difficult for the courts to determine exactly what type of
conduct or action is acceptable and thus protected as "symbolic" speech,
* B.S., Indiana State Univ. (Penna.); Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
' Universal Military Training and Service Act, Sec. 12(b), 62 Stat. 604 (1948), 50
U. S. C. App. Sec. 462 (b) (3) (1965). "Any Person . . . (3) who forges, alters or
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such cer-
tificate or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon ... (6) [shall] upon con-
viction, be fined not to exceed $10,000.00 or be imprisoned for not more than five
years or both."
2 U.S. Const., Amend. I, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."
3 United States v. Edelman, 384 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1967).
4 Smith v. United States, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966).
5 United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966); cert. denied 368 U.S. 911.
6 United States v. O'Brien, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
7 Ibid.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. Sup. 753, 98 P.2d 265 (1939); Hughes v. Superior Court
in and for Contra Costa County, 198 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1948).
12 Ibid.
13 People v. Dail, 22 Cal. App. 2d 642, 140 P.2d 828 (1943).
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and those which are objectionable in that they contravene public policy.' 4
This exact difficulty arose in two of the present cases. The Miller Court
found that it could not determine whether willful burning of a draft card
was speech; nevertheless it was punishable.' 5 In O'Brien, the Court said
it was speech, but still punishable.' 6
Not all conduct, be it private or public, can be interpreted as "sym-
bolic" speech, nor does the First Amendment afford the same kind of
freedom to those who would communicate ideas by violent conduct17 as
it affords to those who communicate by pure speech.'8 This is not to say,
however, that a restriction is being placed upon the communication of
ideas, but merely a partial restriction on the methods which may be used
to communicate them.' 9 When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inciden-
tal limitations on First Amendment freedoms.2° As determined by the
court in People v. Doss, "Freedom of speech (be it by words, actions, or
both) is not an absolute right." 21 Therefore, having established that not
all speech is protected, we must determine which will and which will not
be protected.
Balancing of Interests
One of the earliest tests devised to interpret the legality of certain
speech was set forth by Chief Justice Holmes in his "clear and present
danger test." 22 In applying this test, however, it is difficult to determine
just when clear and present danger has resulted from speech, thus im-
peding remedial processes. 23
More recently the balancing of interests test as enunciated in
American Communications Assn. C. 1. 0. v. Douds24 precludes the clear
and present danger test in determining the constitutionality of legislation
14 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
15 United States v. Miller, supra note 5 at 78.
16 United States v. O'Brien, supra note 6.
17 Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
18 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965).
19 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513 (1949).
20 United States v. O'Brien, supra note 6.
21 People v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307, 46 N.E. 2d 984, 989 (1943); L'Hommedieu v. Board of
Regents of University of State of N.Y., 95 N.Y.S.2d 443, 457 (1941); State v. Chaplin-
sky, 18 A.2d 754 (N. J. 1941).
22 Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919); Wood v.
State, 141 P.2d 309 (1943); Dennis v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 857 (1951).
23 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
24 American Communications Assn. C. I. 0. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 399, 70 S. Ct. 674,
94 L. Ed. 925 (1950). Schneider v. State, supra note 14.
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DRAFT CARD BURNING
which indirectly restricts free speech.2 5 The balancing test involves a
weighing of each parties' interests, thereby determining whose interest
should be advanced in light of the most good for the most people in view
of the prevailing facts and circumstances.2 6 When applied to facts re-
lated to the destruction of draft cards, in whose favor does the balancing
scale tend-the government's or the defendant draft card burner? Let
us first look at the comparative interests of each party:
Defendant: a) communication of an idea; b) dissatisfaction with
governmental policies; c) objection to war in total, or to a particular
war.
Government's: a) uniform military classification; b) smooth func-
tioning of the selective service system; c) maintaining an integral part
of the overall national defense posture.
Herein then, lies the crux of the entire matter, defendants' interests
compared to the government's interests. It seems rather apparent that
the government's position carries more weight. After all, defense of the
nation still is more important than defense of the privilege (or, if you
prefer, even the right) of an individual to speak freely about an opinion
that is debatable. The sheer magnitude of the governmental interests
alone leaves little room for speculation on this point. Moreover, the de-
fendants' acts are related to the individual and affect only the individual,
or those who deem it necessary to follow suit. Contrariwise, the govern-
mental interests are concerned with the overall aspects of a group of
individuals. The government has endeavored to set up a uniform system
of classification for all male citizens. It may not be the best system;
nonetheless it would prove invaluable in time of emergency mobilization
to determine whether or not certain persons were physically qualified
to perform assigned tasks. Certainly the destruction of an individual's
personal copy of this classification cannot be considered protected under
the First Amendment. Thus, I do not think it can be validly argued that
defendant's burning his draft card was the way to express protest. "Po-
litical assassination is a gesture of protest, too, but no one is disposed to
work up any First Amendment enthusiasm for it." 27
Nor can we overlook the alternate routes available to defendants by
which they could have pursued their communicative desires. Destruction
of a "symbolic" slip of paper to effect their "symbolic" speech, peaceful
sit ins, sit downs, and organized marches, are but a few alternatives.
Therefore, in applying the balancing test, it is rather clear at this
point that the government's position is paramount as a matter of at least
necessity. This is not so because it is the government versus an individual
25 Sobel, Constitutional Law-Draft Card Burning-Symbolic Expression Not in Pub-
lic Interest, 16 DePaul L. Rev. 485 (1967).
26 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, supra note 24.
27 Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment 133 (1965).
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or a small group of individuals, but rather because it is the government
versus the acts of a few individuals multiplied a number of times if the
problem is left unremedied. The proper functioning of the Selective
Service System depends upon the aggregate consequences of individual
acts. 28 One or two draft card burnings will not materially hamper the
system. However, the same act committed by a relatively small percent-
age of the total number of registrants could severely handicap an other-
wise efficient system. It should be noted that it is only common sense to
view this controversy in light of foreseeable results, not merely present
results.29 The "public policy" of the government is not limited to such
matters as are considered injurious to the public interests at present, but
any acts reasonably tending to have that effect may be prohibited by
statute, and thereupon they are in derogation of public policy.30
Public Policy
This naturally leads up to the next area of concern, that of contra-
vention of public policy merely because certain acts tend to be bad for
the public's welfare in general. Public policy is not to be found in a book
of codified law. This then precludes an elemental test to determine when
certain acts fall within or without what is considered good public policy.
However, when considering whether a certain act does contravene public
policy, the act must be examined in the face of all relevant factors and
issues existing in and around the public at the time of the act."'
In viewing defendants' acts, we must look at them against the back-
ground of current local and national circumstances. These circumstances
are that this country is, at present, in the throes of both internal turmoil
and external turmoil. That external strife, whether we like it or not, is
war 32 ; not a declared war nor a declared national emergency, but none-
theless a real war. American blood is once again soaking into foreign
real estate. Some say the war is right and others say it is wrong; the
fact remains that our government has elected this course of foreign policy
and we, the people, have elected our government. This is not to advocate
that we need accept, and blindly follow, all tenets set forth by the nation's
leaders. But that is to say that change in national policies will not be
wrought through the destruction of government property.3 3 Nor will
28 United States v. O'Brien, supra note 6.
29 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
30 United States v. Musgrave, 160 F. 700, 702 (D. C. Ark. 1908).
31 Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 Kan. L. Rev. 149,
150 (1968).
32 N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 1, col. 1, President Pledges Full Support to S. Viet-
nam; N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1964, p. 1, col. 8, President Sees No Chance of Negotiating
Peace and Pledged Greater War Effort.
33 People v. Street (N. Y. C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co., July 26, 1966, Appeal pending,App T., 2d Dept.) burning of an American Flag.
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existing laws and statutes be altered by the planned violation of those
laws.34
The law cannot be an instrumentality of which willful violation pro-
vides the impetus to change that law. To use a well worn phrase, the law
is the law, and I think this especially true when ad hoc legislative enact-
ments have spawned that law. 35 It is not for the courts to decide posi-
tively why Congress has enacted specific legislation. Let it suffice that
the Congress has seen fit to so act.36 And if there is to be a change in the
law or the policies regarding the powers of Congress in our government,
such change can only come about through the means provided by our
constitution, and those means are peaceful assembly 37 and the ballot
box. 38
If we then place defendants' acts in their proper perspective, it is
clear that such acts would tend to disrupt the public morale by implant-
ing useless additional seeds of unrest during a period of existing unrest.
It could be argued that such isolated acts may tend to incite rather than
disrupt morale in our public, but consideration of the issue does not stop
on the home front. Due regard must be given the men in the field, both
our own and those of our allies, as well as the enemy. A few indiscrimi-
nate news reports, especially when read or heard out of context, may
have a deleterious effect on at least a small part of the overall war effort.
In other words, a man fighting for his country abroad cannot help but
feel a growing dissatisfaction with his efforts when he is periodically
informed of his countrymen's disdain for those efforts. Again, this is not
to debate the merits of the war per se, but rather to point out the need
for American solidarity, necessitated by changing times. Patriotic? Per-
haps. But does not patriotism any longer fit into the fundamental scheme
of the American ideal? It fits right alongside free speech, dissent, minor-
ity opinions, revolution, and the rest of the inherent and man-made vir-
tues that have made this nation great. Success in any endeavor is predi-
cated on a unified and spirited effort by all concerned.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I for one think it safe to say that the willful destruc-
tion of draft cards, or other similar government certificates for that mat-
ter, may be considered symbolic speech, but that destruction simply is
not within the best interests of public policy, and, is therefore, criminal.
34 Smith v. United States, supra note 4.
35 111 Cong. Rec. 19135 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1965) (Hon. Mendall Rivers introduced
bill before the House).
36 People v. Stover, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 734 (1963); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
87 U.S. Const. Amend. I.
38 Sobel, op. cit. supra note 25.
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1) it is violative of Congressional enactment, 2) it is deliberate destruc-
tion of government property, and 3) considering the relevant factors per-
taining to our foreign involvement, it is an abuse of a constitutionally
conferred right, i.e. Freedom of Speech.
As the court so ably stated in United States v. O'Brien, the now-
leading case in this area of constitutional law:
The many functions performed by Selective Service Certificates
establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substan-
tial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction
and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who
knowingly and willfully destroy or mutilate them.39
It is interesting to note that the defendant in United States v.
O'Brien,40 had his six-year prison term revoked, and was instead placed
on a three-year probationary period on condition that he work as a
civilian at Massachusetts General Hospital. The defendant, a pacifist, had
had a "change of attitude" about the legality of the draft.4'
39 United States v. O'Brien, supra note 6.
40 Ibid.
4' N. Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1968, p. 28, col. 2.
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